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Abstract—Group decision tasks that require pooling of informa-
tion to reach the best decision have been studied across a variety
of disciplines over the past thirty years. The crucial question of
what makes these tasks so difficult, however remains unanswered.
Various hypotheses include inefficiency in sharing information
leading to decisions based on incomplete information or cognitive
inefficiencies in processing and storing information arriving in a
piecemeal fashion. The present study attacks this problem from
two directions. Human experiments are used to compare decisions
between groups manipulated to receive and share information in
raw and aggregated forms and mixed groups comprised of humans
and software agents. To shed light on cognitive limitations that may
affect performance, an ACT-R cognitive model of group members
was constructed and its results compared to human data.
1. INTRODUCTION
In many group decision tasks, group members may pos-
sess unique information which, if completely shared and
used for decision making, would help the group arrive at
optimal decisions. Possessing unique information by group
members has been called the hidden profile paradigm and
was first introduced by ‘`strasser1985. Since the introduction
of the hidden profile paradigm, numerous studies have been
conducted to study various aspects of information sharing
and pooling, discussion of common vs unique information,
group performance, etc. The results of these studies have
not all been in agreement (see [6] for a recent meta-analysis
of 60 papers on the hidden profile group decision making).
Prior studies addressed both the process (how information
is shared) and product (correctness of selected alternative).
The dominant finding about process has been that groups
focus discussion on common rather than unique material. In
fact, groups spend much more time discussing common rather
than unique information [6]. This suboptimality is reflected in
group decisions where hidden profile groups were consistently
much less likely to select the correct alternative than groups
with full information. Related findings, however, suggest that
coverage (the degree to which relevant information has been
shared) may be more important than discussion in improving
decisions.
A key consideration missing from this prior research is the
source of the large difference in performance between groups
receiving common information and those who must tease it out
through discussion and questioning. Another limitation of prior
research is that almost all existing studies report only counts of
information items pooled without regard for the content of the
information shared. Additionally, counting ignores differences
in the usefulness of the information pooled. Certain pieces
of information may be more useful for the task solution than
others. Finally, current research cannot distinguish between
the effects of incomplete coverage and those associated with
cognitive processing limitations in forming, modifying, and
rejecting hypotheses as information is progressively revealed.
Our paper addresses these literature limitations. We have
designed a study that compares the performance of human
teams voluntarily sharing information under conditions compa-
rable to those in reported hidden profile studies with artificial
teams in which a single human teammate is provided full
information by Bots posing as human teammates. Comparison
between these two conditions can elucidate the extent to
which coverage can account for differences in performance
between hidden profile and full information groups, because
the Bots, by design, supply all relevant information while
human team mates choose what information to pass on in
the manner of hidden profile experiments. Although a true
control providing human teams with full information at the
outset is not available, the size of the effect between human
and artificial teams can provide indications of the degree to
which information sharing alone could account for the large
differences commonly observed between hidden profile and
full information teams.
Our study also addresses the prior limitations of the litera-
ture as to the contributions of coverage and cognitive limita-
tions to the hidden profile deficit. In particular, we consider a
guess and no-guess condition. In the guess conditions, decision
makers share their best “guess” of the answer to their role’s
designated question. This guess is visible to all the other group
members. It is hypothesized that because a guess represents
a summary information of the deliberation of another team
mate, the decision maker does not need to spend cognitive
effort storing data, reviewing, and revising hypotheses.
To deal with limitations of prior research in considering
cognitive processing characteristics in information sharing and
hypothesis formation and modification, we have developed a
human computational model based on the ACT-R cognitive
architecture [1] for performing the task to help identify mem-
ory, attentional and other mechanisms that may be implicated
in the task performance. This model’s mechanisms, such as
spreading activation and reliance on probability estimation
rather than logic in judging data and hypotheses, replicate
well known cognitive biases such as availability, recency, and
confirmation bias [5].
We present the design of an experiment intended to ad-
dress these issues, specifically by allowing decision-makers
to selectively share detailed information or a high-level guess
regarding a variety of questions that can be answered using
the information. We subsequently present an analysis of the
experimental results as well as results comparing the ACT-R
model to the human data. We present conclusions and plans
for future work.
2. EXPERIMENTAL TASK
The task used simulates, using textual information, an
artificial world region with political unrest. It requires four
cooperating subjects to discover a variety of details and draw
conclusions regarding an impending terrorist attack. The data
underlying this task are from ELICIT [2]. Facts1 from which
these conclusions can be drawn are released to the subjects in
3 stages over time.
Each of the four subjects is given a role, i.e. to answer
a different question about the attack: who, where, what and
when. In other words, in each trial there are four roles (who,
what, where, when) each assumed by a different subject. Role
assignment is done by the system at the beginning of each
trial. There are four different trials, the first of which is a
training trial, followed by three experimental trials, each with
a different set of facts concernign different groups, targets, and
country names. The answer to the who question is the name
of the group expected to conduct the attack; group names are
denoted by colors, such as the “gold group” or the “violet
group.” The answer to the where question is a country name;
country names are denoted by Greek letter names, such as
“Chiland” or “Omegaland.” The answer to the what question
is the intended target, such as “embassy” or “military base.”
The answer to the when question has a four-fold structure,
consisting of month name, day of the month, hour on a twelve
hour clock, and “AM” or “PM.” While not the subject of any
of the questions, there are also individuals, who serve as links
connecting some of the facts presented to subjects. Individuals
are named after animals, such as “the Lion” or “the Jackal.”
The facts delivered to the subjects are sentences. Some are
simple and immediately useful, such as “The attack will be at
11:00.” Others are more complex, and must be combined with
other information to be useful; for example, “The Azure and
Brown groups prefer to attack at night,” or “The Lion is known
to work only with the Azure, Brown, or Violet groups.” Some
of the facts delivered are essential for constructing correct
answers, others are helpful but not essential, and still others
are mere noise, contributing nothing to correct answers.
In each wave, the system gives a set of facts to each
participant/role. These sets of facts are disjoint, in other words
no fact in a set is given to more than one subject. A participant
may receive some facts relevant to determining the solution
to its role and other facts that may not be useful to her
but possibly useful to other roles. A participant is free to
determine whether and to whom to forward facts she has
1ELICIT calls these statements “factoids”
received. For example, the participant in the role of what may
receive the fact “The Violet group prefers to work in Alphaland
or Omegaland”. This fact is relevant to the who role and the
where role although it is not directly relevant to the what role
(though later on it may be indirectly relevant if information
that links the Violet group to some specific target becomes
available).
For each trial, 68 facts are distributed in three waves.
Each wave contains roughly 1/3 of the 68 facts. Between two
consecutive waves, the subjects have 5 minutes to process a
wave of new facts. Each trial lasted 15 minutes. At the end
of each trial, the subjects submitted their best answer to the
question of their role.
The experiment had the following conditions: First condi-
tion was the “only-humans; no-guess” condition where the
subjects received the facts in 3 waves, made decisions on
information sharing, shared information and made their final
answer within the 15 minute trial interval. Note that the
subjects were not encouraged to give their answer as early
as possible but were left to decide to give their answer as
soon as they felt confident about it. The second condition
was the “only-humans; guess” condition which is same as the
“only-humans; no-guess” condition except that each subject
made a guess as to the answer to her question, along with
her confidence in the guess on a five point scale, after each
wave. All guesses were shown to the other agents. The third
condition was the “robot-humans;no-guess” where a human
was teamed with three software agents. However, since the
communication was via a computer interface, the human did
not know that her team mates were computer programs. The
agents always forwarded all the pieces of information that
were useful to each role. The fourth condition was “robot-
humans;guess” where the human was teamed with software
agents and where she made guesses at the end of each wave.
The agents also publicized their guesses. The agents were
programmed to make the correct guess after the first wave
and their guess did not change after the second or third. By
contrast, in the human only condition, the guess of a person
could change as he accumulated more information in each
subsequent wave.
The four subjects interacted with the system and with
each other through a web-based user interface, Figure 1,
implemented with HTML and JavaScript. This interface is
divided into several panes. One, on the right, summarizes the
player’s current role (who, where, what or when), describes
the names and roles of the other players, and allows access to
the instructions for reference.
The most prominent pane of the interface is the inbox,
to which new facts are delivered. These may be new facts,
delivered by the system; or they may be facts forwarded
by another subject. Facts are normally displayed here in a
partially obscured form, with only a few keywords, such as
“Yellow,” “Magenta” and “Green,” legible, the rest of the text
being replaced with ellipses. The user can click on a fact to
cause the full text to be presented. When the mouse pointer is
moved off the fact, it is partially obscured again (see Figure
Figure 1: The user interface of the experiment
2). The aim of this design was to enable us to get a handle
on which facts each user was paying attention to and for how
long. This information is useful to determine which facts they
potentially considered most useful and also determine memory
limitations.
Below the inbox is a pane multiplexed for three purposes:
outbox, mylist and guessbox. When used as the outbox facts
can be dragged to it, and forwarded to other subjects, in whose
inbox they will appear. When used as mylist, facts can be
dragged to it for future reference. While users can use this for
whatever purpose they choose, it is expected that those who
do employ it will use it to consolidate facts they suspect are
important for answering their own question. Facts in mylist,
as in the inbox, are normally partially obscured, and must be
clicked to be read in full.
Although ELICIT at first glance differs from the classical
hidden profile task along a number of dimensions, on closer
examination the essential elements of these tasks are the same.
The primary differences are: 1) In hidden profile studies group
members share information and discuss it in order to arrive at a
group decision. In ELICIT, group members share information
in order to arrive at individual decisions. We believe that this
distinction is less telling than it appears because hidden profile
experiments are designed such that “the common information
favors a suboptimal decision alternative, whereas all the unique
information combined reveals the optimal alternative” [7].
Because the optimal decision is predetermined when all the
information is pooled, the process being investigated in the
hidden profile experiments is information sharing and not deci-
sion making per se. Decision makers in ELICIT face the same
situation in that their decisions rely on information shared by
the group and are largely predetermined by what is shared.
2) In hidden profile studies group members are provided with
both common and unique information. Much analysis has in-
volved the attention paid to common and unique information in
group discussions. In ELICIT all information is unique until it
has been shared. This prevents the corresponding comparisons
between the use of common and unique information. Measures
of coverage and sharing of relevant information, however, are
available and allow comparisons. The cognitive limitations
hypothesis is consistent with the hidden profile observation
[6] that groups focus on common (prior) information and
provides an alternate explanation, namely that attentional and
memory limitations prevent the consideration of the entire set
of information when making decisions. Rather, a small subset
of information is favored, often that which is more directly
available (availability bias), has been accessed more recently
and is thus more active in memory (recency bias), or has been
the lead hypothesis and thus has been repeatedly reinforced
(confirmation bias). Data on participants’ attention paid to
different pieces of information are available and analyzed from
our ELICIT experiment.
3. ACT-R COGNITIVE MODEL
The ACT-R model uses the ACT-R cognitive architecture
[1] and in particular leverages the activation calculus in
declarative memory. This modeling approach reflects the fact
that performance in this task heavily relies on retrieval of
information from memory, and the activation processes in
(a) Factoid in keywords (b) Factoid content expanded
Figure 2: Experimental UI on tracking subject attention
ACT-R declarative memory provide powerful mechanisms to
guide information retrieval as well as embody limitations
on the storage and retrieval of memories under demanding
conditions.
The task is decomposed into three component sub-tasks:
information sharing, inductive inference, and probability es-
timation. The goal of the information sharing subtask is to
determine which facts to share, and if so with which of their
teammate(s). The basic approach is to share facts that are
semantically related to the question domain of the teammate,
e.g., share facts containing location information with the
person in charge of the ’who’ question. The implementation
leverages the ACT-R partial matching mechanism that retrieves
chunks in declarative memory by combining activation with
semantic similarities.
The goal of the inductive inference subtask is to determine
the relevance and applicability of various facts to the specific
question. The approach is to activate facts whose context is
associated with a specific guess or answer. The implementation
leverages the ACT-R spreading activation and base-level learn-
ing mechanisms. Finally, the goal of the probability estimation
task is to determine the probability of each candidate answer
given various facts and their activation. This approach is
grounded in the assumption to represent each fact as a rough
probability estimate over the given options. The probability
estimation process leverages the blending memory retrieval
mechanism to generate aggregate estimates.
The information sharing model assumes that people use
primarily simple heuristics in determining whether information
is relevant to another decision maker. In this case, the assump-
tion is that subjects share a fact if they contain information
of the same semantic domain as that person’s question (e.g.,
location information if the given question is ’who’). While
this approach is well short of optimal it has the advantage
of being highly efficient and avoids assuming knowledge of
the other decision makers processes that is unlikely to be
available. To avoid implementing this approach using large
numbers of ad hoc heuristic rules (e.g., one for each combi-
nation of question and answer), pattern matching processes in
memory are used instead. Each fact is encoded as a set of
semantic keywords reflecting the key information contained
in the sentence. For each subject and given question, each
keyword is matched against the various questions to determine
if it contains information related to that question’s domain.
The ACT-R partial matching mechanism is used by setting
high semantic similarities between concepts of a common
domain (e.g., locations like ’psi’ and ’chi’, and a question like
’where’). This will result in the relevant question(s) retrieved
for each fact, indicating the relevant decision maker with
whom to share that fact. The mismatch penalty scaling factor
controlling the partial matching process will determine the
selectivity of the process. Thus varying the scaling factor
can determine the overall willingness to share information,
leading to individual differences reflected in more conservative
or widespread sharing.
The inductive inference model is used to reflect dependen-
cies between answers to different questions. For instance, an
answer (or guess) of a given location to a ’where’ question
(e.g., ’psi’) will raise the relevance of facts mentioning that lo-
cation when answering other questions (e.g., ’who’). The most
natural way to implement that dependency process is to use
the spreading activation mechanism. To do that, each fact is
associated with a context element representing its dependency
upon another answer (guess). When a given answer is pro-
cessed, related facts are retrieved from memory by spreading
activation from that answer to the facts including that answer
as context. Those facts receive a boost in activation from
the base-level learning process, making them more salient in
the subsequent probability estimation process. This boost can
result in well-known cognitive biases such as availability bias.
This approach is similar to the model of the impact of memory
availability in the model of sequential diagnostic reasoning of
Melhorn et al (2011).
The probability estimation model follows the instance-based
learning (IBL) modeling methodology [3]. To provide for finer
discrimination in judgment and ensure the ability to gradually
accumulate evidence from a stream of individual facts, the
basic problem of determining the most likely candidate answer
for each question is formulated as a goal to assign a probability
to each potential answer. The goal is defined as a chunk of
type hypothesis that contains three slots:
• Question: the representation of the question, i.e., who,
what, where and when
• Answer: the representation of each possible answer, e.g.,
various groups for who
• Probability: a probability value assigned to the question-
answer pair
This representation follows the general IBL pattern of con-
text (question), decision (answer) and outcome (probability).
In keeping with the instance-based methodology, this repre-
sentation is used both for facts as well as goals. Specifically,
most facts are transformed into chunks of this type if they
make a strong assertion about a given question. For instance,
if the fact rules out a particular group, a hypothesis chunk
will be created (or reinforced if it already exists) stating
(who, group, 0). Conversely, if it strongly implies a group’s
involvement, the chunk (who, group, 100) will be created. If
the fact mentions the possible involvement of n groups, then
a separate hypothesis chunk is created for each group with a
probability of 1/n, reflecting mutually exclusive participation.
Of course, those assertions are not literally correct–rather
the intent is to provide the basis for a rough estimate of relative
probabilities based on the information provided. More precise
facts (e.g., stating actual probabilities, or using qualifiers such
as likely or probably) could be used to create more accurate
chunk encodings. When the model is asked to generate a
guess to a question, it iterates through all the possible answers
(e.g., all the groups for a who question) and generates a
probability estimate for each using the blending mechanism
used for memory retrievals [4]. During memory retrievals, each
chunk in memory has an activation that reflects factors such
as recency, frequency, and degree of match to the requested
pattern. Recency is factored through a power law decay from
the time that the chunk is created. Frequency reflects a power
law of practice of the numbers of times that a chunk is
strengthened following rehearsals. For degree of match, we
assume for simplicity that each question and answer are
distinct and no similarities are defined. Blending retrieval
then assigns for a given question-answer pair a probability
to each chunk matching that request (in general, there will be
several) reflecting a softmax (Boltzmann) distribution of chunk
activations given a certain amount of noise. Those probability
estimates for each chunk associated with the question-answer
pair are then blended according to a weighted average of the
chunk probabilities (assuming linear similarities over the prob-
ability space [5]). The probability estimates are not normalized
but instead the largest one is selected to generate the guess.
All parameters controlling the behavior of the model are left
at their default values: the base-level decay rate is 0.5, the
mismatch penalty is 2.5, the activation noise is 0.25, and the
blending temperature is 0.4.
Note that, as mandated by the ACT-R theory, the hypothesis
goals generated to provide the guess become themselves
chunks in memory, as are guesses received from other agents.
This can give rise to cognitive biases such as confirmation
bias, where a strong initial estimate leads to overoptimistic
estimates later despite contradictory evidence.
4. RESULTS
Sixty subjects, divided into twelve groups of five, were
recruited and finished the task. While they did not know how
they were divided, four of each five worked cooperatively
together, and the fifth worked separately, with three bots.
Table I shows the logistic regression of correct decisions on
bot (group type Bot vs. human), guess (with or without guess
on other questions), and question (who, what, or where). Main
effects were found for both Bot and question along with a 2-
way interaction for guess x question and a 3-way interaction
among all terms.
Table I
Logistic Regression on Correct Decisions
Coefficients Estimate Std. Er-
ror
z Value P(> |z|)
(Intercept) −.06908 0.4664 −1.481 0.13860
robot 3.2338 1.4901 2.170 0.03000
guess 1.9183 0.6947 2.761 0.00576
question 0.2481 0.3541 0.701 0.48352
robot x guess −2.8053 2.0008 −1.402 0.16089
robot x question −1.6171 0.9668 −1.673 0.09439
robot x guess x
question
2.9267 1.4176 2.064 0.03897
A. Information Sharing
We have hypothesized three factors implicated in producing
the large difference in accuracy in hidden profile experiments
[6] observed between groups provided with full information
at the outset, called the manifest profile, and those required to
share information over the course of a discussion.
• deficiency in sharing of information (do players share
the right facts)/coverage of information (degree to which
relevant information has been shared),
• cognitive processing limitations (deficits due to sequential
processing of information)
• attention to information (degree to which relevant infor-
mation received from others has been accessed)
Decisions were scored for correctness (correct/incorrect)
and effects of conditions tested using logistic regression.
Deficiency in sharing information/coverage Deficiency
in sharing information leading to incomplete coverage of
what is known within the group is likely to be one of the
contributors to the underperformance of hidden profile groups.
This deficiency is presumed to arise because group members
do not recognize the usefulness of their unique information to
other members of the group. In our experiment, the effects
of deficiency in voluntary sharing of information can be
examined by comparing the performance (correct decisions)
of the Bot groups in which the human decision maker received
all information relevant to his decision with human groups in
which only information thought relevant by other players was
shared. The extent to which these performances vary indicates
the degree to which incomplete information rather than lim-
itations in information processing led to incorrect decisions.
The logistic regression contrasting human and Bot conditions
found superior performance for decisions made in the Bot
condition. The accuracy of decision in the human condition
was 43%, whereas in the Bot condition, it was 72% (z= 2.170,
p = .03). This advantage held for each of the decision types,
Figure 3: Correctness of results across all questions and and
the guess and no-guess conditions. G=guess, NG= no guess;
H=human, R=robot. Therefore GH denotes the condition of
guess for human only teams and NGR denotes the conditin of
no-guess in the robot human team.
namely: what, where accuracy in condition human= 40%, and
in condition bot= 67% (z = 2.021, p = .043); who, accuracy of
condition human= 54%, and condition bot= 80% (z = 2.385,
p = .017), and where, accuracy in condition human= 33%, and
in condition bot= 58% (z = 3.719, p < .001).
Another element that is important and has not been exam-
ined in the literature is the content of the information shared.
In the ELICIT experiment, the facts that were relevant to
a particular decision were notated in the data, however this
relevance was not known to the participants. Since we had this
“ground truth” we were able to determine the rates at which
different categories of facts were shared. The categories we
examined were:
• TP: true positive = the message should be sent and it is
sent
• FP: false positive = the message should not be sent but
it is sent
• TN: true negative = the message should not be sent and
it is not sent
• FN: false negative = the message should be sent but it
is not sent
• TPR (true positive rate ) = TP / ( TP + FN)
• FNR (false negative rate ) = FN / ( TP + FN) = 1 - TPR
• FPR (false positive rate) = FP / (FP + TN)
• TNR (true negative rate) = TN / (TN + FP)
Figure 4: Rate of false negatives, i.e. messages that should
have been shared but were not
Figure 4 shows the rate of sharing of false negative mes-
sages. From the figure we see that for example, for the what
question, the rate of false negatives was higher than others.
This correlates with the low correctness for the what question
(see figure 3).
Cognitive Processing Limitations The cognitive process-
ing limitation explanation for hidden profile underperfor-
mance, was also supported by these data. The guess manip-
ulation in the experiment provided decision makers receiving
guesses with preprocessed/summary data, freeing them from
the obligation to acquire, store, and revise hypotheses about
answers to the other questionss needed to support their own
decisions. As a consequence, if deficits in performance were
occurring due to difficulties in remembering facts and revising
hypotheses, these difficulties should be reduced by the guesses
provided to the decision makers. This manipulation, however,
does not eliminate the need to acquire and store information
and to maintain and revise hypotheses about the decision
maker’s own question so the reduction in cognitive load is
only partial. As the regression shows, providing guesses led to
marked improvement overall (z= 2.76, p< .006). As indicated
by the 3-way interaction, however, support through guessing
was particularly effective in the Bot condition where correct
information was always provided.
Attention to Information Our data do not allow direct
comparison with the hidden profile finding [6] that “common”
information receives more attention in discussion than infor-
mation that is unique to individual decision makers. We do,
however, have detailed records through the content expansion
mechanism of the information to which users have attended
(see Figures 5 and 6). Analyzing these data we find that
the percentage of relevant information among that which
is attended is related to improved performance (z = 1.92,
p < .05).
(a) ACT-R (b) Human
Figure 7: Results of ACT-R and Human on “who” question
(a) ACT-R (b) Human
Figure 8: Results of ACT-R and Human on “where” question
Figure 5: Attention of players assigned “who” question Figure 6: Attention of players assigned “what” question
B. Comparison of ACT-R model and humans
Among the 60 subjects who participated in our experiments,
15 of them (including the subjects who worked with Bots)
answered the “who” question for the fact set “1aGMU17”,
one of the three fact sets in the experimental trials. Sample
results for the “who” question are presented in Figure 7 of
fact set “1aGMU17”. Probability estimates for each possible
answer (i.e., all groups) are presented for each of three waves
of facts. Among all the human participants, 50% reached to
the correct answer, “the Violet group”, after seeing the first
wave of facts. After seeing the second wave of facts, 100% of
the participants reached the correct answer. However, after the
third wave, about 40% of the participants were confused by
the new facts and changed their answers from the correct one.
In other words, for the human subjects, the initial estimate
for the violet group (the correct answer, as it turns out) is
the highest but closely matched by competing groups such
as purple and gold (purple and azure for human subjects).
This reflects the lack of complete information to conclusively
decide between competing alternatives after the first batch of
facts, leading the probability estimation process to fragment its
estimates. Following the second batch of facts, violet emerges
as the strong consensus answer (unanimous in the case of
human subjects) following confirming evidence. However, the
estimate for the violet group falls after the third batch of facts
due to a dilution effect from a number of facts mentioning
other possibilities. Those other three or four possibilities do
not rise to seriously challenge the leading answer, but they
introduce enough doubt to drag down its probability. The
fact that an answer (correct as it turns out) that was (near)
unanimous is thrown in doubt by incidental evidence that does
not in any way invalidate it establishes the true nature of the
process as one of gradual, approximate, implicit aggregation
rather than precise, symbolic, flawless deduction. Note that
these results were generated without reflecting the effect of
previous guesses on later phases. This would be a case where
confirmation bias could actually lead to a correct final answer
by strengthening the correct guess based on the effect of early
evidence and prevent its reconsideration in light of additional
facts. As is generally the case, bias is always relative to its
environment.
The dynamics of results for the “where” question are
substantially different (see Figure 8). There, the leading (and
correct) hypothesis (“Psi”) quickly establishes itself. While no
alternative establishes itself as a serious competitor, they do
not disappear either but rather sightly fluctuate with each new
wave of fact incapable of decisively tilting the balance in either
direction. This reflects the cognitive and process limitations of
model and human subjects that, despite the potential availabil-
ity of all needed information, failed to conclusively reach the
correct answer.
While both data analysis and model development are pre-
liminary, they highlight interesting emerging effects. In both
the human data and the cognitive model, rather than following
a linear path, the deductive processes faced with a constant
stream of facts induce a fluctuation in beliefs that reflect a
potentially rich dynamic. This evidence for information accre-
tion in both human subjects and the ACT-R model support the
cognitive limitation explanation for the poor performance of
hidden profile groups.
5. DISCUSSION
The ELICIT intelligence analysis simulation has provided
an opportunity to investigate well documented information
sharing effects found in hidden profile studies. By eliciting
multiple decisions per experiment, direct attentional measures
through mouse-overs, and informationally optimal groups
through use of bots our experiments have allowed us to
entertain questions which could not easily be addressed within
the conventional paradigm. One difference lies in the magni-
tude of effects found within the two experimental settings. A
meta-analysis of 65 hidden profile studies [6] found an eight
fold difference (positive odds ratio of 8.05) between manifest
profile and hidden profile groups. Differences observed in our
experiments were more modest. Our ELICIT experiments do
not have a full equivalent of a manifest profile control but
do have a Bot-Guess condition in which decision makers re-
ceived complete information with a substantial amount already
aggregated and abstracted. Under these conditions a differ-
ence of approximately 2:1 in correct decisions was observed
suggesting that the information processing load imposed by
integrating arriving information is likely a significant, though
not sole, contributor to the hidden profile deficit.
Coverage, the extent to which relevant knowledge was
shared with the group was found in [6] to be the primary
determinant of hidden profile decision quality. Our experiment
found a similar effect with the Bot conditions in which deci-
sion makers received full information outperforming human
groups where information sharing was by choice. The inclu-
sion of Bots within human decision making studies provides a
methodological advance for untangling the effects of cognitive
limitations due to incremental information presentation and
the extent information coverage. Bot conditions allow precise
manipulation of information sharing which cannot be obtained
in all human experiments where coverage must be assessed by
monitoring information brought up in discussion. By allowing
the experimenter to ensure full information sharing while
supplying information incrementally, our Bot methodology
could allow direct comparison between manifest and hidden
profile decision making while controlling for coverage.
Although our current data analysis does not distinguish
between attention paid to information forwarded to a decision
maker by other players (corresponding to the sharing of unique
information in hidden profile), from information provided
directly in the three waves (corresponding to common infor-
mation that could be processed as a unit), our information
tracking and attention measuring mechanisms would allow
such labeling so that the relations between coverage and
attention found in hidden profile studies could be addressed
in the ELICIT context.
The primary contribution of this work has been to advance
the role of cognitive limitations due to serial processing
of shared information to decision making deficits in hidden
profile studies and other situations requiring the pooling of
information. The Bot methodology we have introduced allows
control of information coverage and presentation in ways
otherwise infeasible. The strong similarities between the ACT-
R model which incorporates cognitive mechanisms producing
deficits for sequential information presentation and human per-
formance at the ELICIT task further supports this explanation.
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